Renamed file
Renaming alone does not change the content digest. Keep both names and check the selected object.
In-depth practical guides
Matching names, sizes or appearances do not establish identical versions. A SHA-256 digest represents file bytes. It helps detect changes without establishing authorship, creation date or truth of the contents.
Updated :

AI-generated illustration
Digest comparison starts with the exact file, algorithm and expected reference. Saving again, changing encoding or adding a line ending can alter bytes without an obvious on-screen difference. Keep integrity checking separate from checking origin.
Use the preserved original. Printing to PDF, exporting or recompressing an image can preserve meaning while changing bytes. Compare equivalent objects.
Calculate SHA-256 with a checker suited to your environment. Compare complete digests and confirm that the checked file is the intended version.
Calculate SHA-256 for each selected file and compare all 64 hexadecimal characters. Check the algorithm on both sides; an initial digest fragment or file size alone is insufficient.
Record the algorithm, full digest, byte size, file and check time in your register. Add the origin of the expected reference and the collection date, separate from calculation time.
With the same algorithm and correct calculations, different digests indicate different bytes. Investigate a new version, transformation or wrong file. Do not automatically infer forgery.
Guided reading of an excerpt
A uses NIST’s test message abc without a line ending. B adds one LF byte. The visible strings may appear identical, but A contains three bytes and B four.
Fictional exercise: identifiers, values and dates illustrate the check. This excerpt is not a live collected response.
A: hexadecimal 61 62 63. B: 61 62 63 0a. No BOM, space or carriage return is added.
Both calculations use SHA-256. The digests below differ even if an editor hides the line ending.
Here LF explains the change; it does not establish forgery. For a real document, investigate the transformation before concluding.
A (3 bytes): 61 62 63
SHA-256: ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad
B (4 bytes): 61 62 63 0a
SHA-256: edeaaff3f1774ad2888673770c6d64097e391bc362d7d6fb34982ddf0efd18cbNo, if only the name or path changes and the bytes remain intact. Saving again in an editor can change encoding, BOM or line endings; check the actual transformation.
Official references : NIST · SHA-256 example values
Typical situations for preparing a check. They do not describe completed assignments or actual observations.
Renaming alone does not change the content digest. Keep both names and check the selected object.
Pagination or metadata may change on export. Digests can differ while the quoted passage appears unchanged; compare text and version.
Agreement checks consistency between digest and file. Sender identity and document origin need separate checks.
Worked exercise
Fictional example: the values and documents teach the method and do not describe a real organisation.
The calculated hashes differ, but the first-page passage looks identical. Full hash values are not reproduced in this table.
If the table exceeds the screen, scroll horizontally; arrow keys work when the region is focused.
| Storage folder | File name | SHA-256 comparison |
|---|---|---|
| A | rapport.pdf | Different from folder B’s |
| B | rapport.pdf | Different from folder A’s |
Different hashes establish different bytes. They do not establish the official version or whether the claim changed. Read the passage and both objects' provenance; do not substitute files merely because names match.
A hash matching one published by a source also needs a correctly identified source reference. Extend the test by renaming a copy without changing its bytes: its digest stays the same. The filename is not part of the hashed content. Keep provenance and acquisition date separately; a digest does not certify the document’s author.
Keep name, working path, size, hash, origin and passage location.
Documentation reference : NIST — FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard · Consulted on
The exact file retained or transmitted, in its actual format. Text copied from a PDF and the PDF itself are different objects even if the passage looks identical.
No. Incorrect information retains a stable digest while its bytes stay unchanged. Check source, author, context and content separately; the digest identifies the version reviewed.
Choose a tool that reads file bytes using SHA-256. In PowerShell, Get-FileHash accepts -Algorithm SHA256 and -LiteralPath. Record the complete result and confirm the selected file.
DOCUMENTED REFERENCE
WARC 1.1 distinguishes a record block from its payload. Lengths 1902 and 1662 come from the response example in Annex B; they are documentation values, not measurements recalculated here on an available file.
| Reference | Value or form | What it identifies |
|---|---|---|
| WARC-Block-Digest | algorithm:digest | An optional digest of the entire record block. For application/http, this includes the encapsulated HTTP response, not the outer WARC headers. |
| WARC-Payload-Digest | algorithm:digest | An optional digest of the payload contained or referenced. For application/http it covers the entity body; a revisit’s payload may be absent from the current block. |
| WARC · Content-Length | 1902 | In the specification’s example, byte length of the WARC block containing the HTTP response. It is not the total size of a .warc.gz file. |
| HTTP · Content-Length | 1662 | In that same example, the declared length of the encapsulated JPEG body. It differs from the block length, which also includes HTTP headers. |
| WARC-Refers-To | WARC-Record-ID | References another record’s identifier, including in revisits. Resolve the reference and check the profile before claiming to hold a complete payload. |
| WARC-Truncated | length / time / disconnect / unspecified | Signals truncation and its reason. Content-Length still describes the stored block’s actual size; consistent length does not establish capture of the whole resource. |
Do not directly compare these digests with a compressed container or replayed file’s checksum. Record algorithm, value encoding, covered bytes and decompression or extraction. A valid digest does not establish authorship or factual accuracy.
No. Encapsulated headers can differ, and segmentation changes blocks. Examine the relevant payload after documented extraction, then compare the passage actually used.
Documentation consulted on .
DOCUMENTED REFERENCE
A timestamp token binds a digest to a time indication signed by a time-stamping authority, or TSA. RFC 3161 separates existence of bytes from document authorship dates and factual truth.
| Reference | Value or form | What it identifies |
|---|---|---|
| messageImprint | hashAlgorithm + hashedMessage | Algorithm and digest of the submitted data. Recalculate on the exact item to check the match; the TSA need not receive the document itself. |
| genTime | GeneralizedTime · UTC | Token creation time according to the TSA, encoded in UTC. It is neither first publication nor the time of events described in the file. |
| accuracy | seconds / millis / micros | Time deviation around genTime. This optional field’s absence does not imply perfect precision; the TSA policy may supply the information. |
| ordering | FALSE / TRUE | Without true ordering, genTime orders two tokens only if their separation exceeds the sum of their accuracies. True ordering enables ordering tokens from the same TSA. |
| nonce | TimeStampReq ↔ TSTInfo | If present in the request, it must be copied unchanged into the response. It links response to request and is not a date. |
| policy | TSAPolicyId | Identifier of the policy under which the token was issued. Retain its version to interpret accuracy and service commitments. |
| serialNumber | TSA | Token number assigned by the TSA, unique within that authority. It is neither a universal document identifier nor a public publication counter. |
Also validate the token signature, TSA certificate and trust context. Retain token, checked file, algorithm, result and validation date. Format conformity alone establishes neither a particular legal status nor factual accuracy.
A claimed date and a signed token are different objects. Identify the data covered, verify its digest and retain the validation result before using the token time.
Documentation consulted on .
DOCUMENTED REFERENCE
A signature image, typed name or visible stamp does not establish a validated digital signature. PDF structure and validator reports distinguish appearance, cryptographic coverage and later changes.
| Reference | Value or form | What it identifies |
|---|---|---|
| /ByteRange | offset / length | Describes byte ranges covered by the signature. The validator checks consistency and placement of the signature-value exclusion; the first number alone is insufficient. |
| /Contents | CMS | Contains the signature value, generally CMS for PAdES. This structural field is not the signature drawing displayed on a page. |
| /M | PDF date | Claimed date in the signature dictionary. It does not replace a validated timestamp or alone establish document authorship time. |
| incremental update | append | An incremental update appends a revision without rewriting all earlier bytes. Successive signatures can cover different revisions of the final file. |
| /DocMDP | P = 1 / 2 / 3 | Certification-signature parameters governing permitted changes. Distinguish form filling, signing and annotations; apply the PDF version and profile rules rather than visual comparison alone. |
| /FieldMDP | /Fields | Form-field restrictions, separate from document permissions. Check which fields are affected before concluding the entire form was frozen. |
Retain the received file unchanged and inspect each signature result, covered revision and detected changes. Printing or re-export can lose this structure. Whole-file SHA-256 matching and signature validation answer different questions.
Not automatically. Examine the covered revision, subsequent additions and permissions. Validation of signed bytes must not be restated as approval of every later addition.
Documentation consulted on .
DOCUMENTED REFERENCE
Base64 represents bytes using ASCII characters. It is neither encryption nor a digest: decoding recovers the data. The seven RFC 4648 vectors below are public references with no real secret.
The three hexadecimal bytes 66 6F 6F represent foo and become four Base64 symbols Zm9v. The 24 bits are regrouped in sixes.
| Reference | Value or form | What it identifies |
|---|---|---|
| ALPHABET | A–Z · a–z · 0–9 · + / | Classic Base64 uses + and / for values 62 and 63. Read a value using its protocol’s alphabet, without silently replacing characters. |
| base64url | 62: - · 63: _ | Base64url replaces these signs with - and _. The name identifies a different alphabet; alone it does not determine whether = may be omitted. |
| QUANTUM | 3 bytes → 4 symbols | Each complete group of three bytes produces four symbols. Encoded length is neither file size nor the character count of decoded text. |
| PADDING | 1 byte: == · 2 bytes: = | One final byte requires two = signs; two final bytes require one. Omitting padding requires an explicit calling protocol contract. Do not accept an arbitrary truncated ending. |
| PAD BITS | 0 | Unused bits in the final symbol must be zero for canonical encoding. A permissive decoder may recover identical bytes from another spelling; this reader rejects noncanonical forms. |
| NON-ALPHABET | reject by default | The general rule rejects non-alphabet characters including line breaks unless the protocol defines an exception. This reader is strict: no spaces or returns are removed. |
Decoding stays in this page. Initial example: foobar, a public RFC 4648 vector. No file is uploaded.
Maximum 1024 characters. Spaces and line breaks rejected. Unused bits must be zero. An empty string represents zero bytes.
Encoding conforms to the selected profile.
Byte count : 6
66 6F 6F 62 61 72
foobar
An initial UTF-8 marker is preserved in bytes and decoded text.
| Source (ASCII) | Published Base64 | Hexadecimal | Bytes |
|---|---|---|---|
| "" | "" | — | 0 |
| "f" | "Zg==" | 66 | 1 |
| "fo" | "Zm8=" | 66 6F | 2 |
| "foo" | "Zm9v" | 66 6F 6F | 3 |
| "foob" | "Zm9vYg==" | 66 6F 6F 62 | 4 |
| "fooba" | "Zm9vYmE=" | 66 6F 6F 62 61 | 5 |
| "foobar" | "Zm9vYmFy" | 66 6F 6F 62 61 72 | 6 |
Documentation examples; no observations of this site. RFC 4648 § 10. Copyright © 2000–2006 Simon Josefsson.
15. Copying Conditions
Copyright (c) 2000-2006 Simon Josefsson
Regarding the abstract and sections 1, 3, 8, 10, 12, 13, and 14 of
this document, that were written by Simon Josefsson ("the author",
for the remainder of this section), the author makes no guarantees
and is not responsible for any damage resulting from its use. The
author grants irrevocable permission to anyone to use, modify, and
distribute it in any way that does not diminish the rights of anyone
else to use, modify, and distribute it, provided that redistributed
derivative works do not contain misleading author or version
information and do not falsely purport to be IETF RFC documents.
Derivative works need not be licensed under similar terms.Three explicit profiles: classic padded, URL padded and URL unpadded. They inspect syntax and bytes without establishing token or signature validity.
No. It may contain any bytes, including misleading text. Encoding validity establishes neither sender, access rights nor content meaning.
Documentation consulted on .
DOCUMENTED REFERENCE
An unkeyed digest and a keyed authentication code provide different information. Two RFC 4231 cases make the distinction verifiable with explicit test bytes.
| Reference | Value or form | What it identifies |
|---|---|---|
| SHA-256 | message → digest | A plain SHA-256 digest depends on the message. Anyone holding the same bytes can recompute it; publishing file and digest together does not automatically identify an author. |
| HMAC-SHA-256 | key + message → MAC | HMAC-SHA-256 depends on key and message using the HMAC construction. It is not simply SHA-256 of text prefixed by a password, nor another spelling of an existing digest. |
| KEY | shared secret | Verification needs the same secret key. A party knowing that key can also produce valid codes, so the result does not publicly attribute a message to just one group member. |
| RFC 4231 §4.2 | 20 key bytes · 8 data bytes | The first vector uses twenty bytes of hexadecimal 0b and the eight ASCII bytes of Hi There. Its public test key is not a recommendation for creating secrets. |
| RFC 4231 §4.3 | 4 key bytes · 28 data bytes | The second uses ASCII key Jefe and twenty-eight data bytes. Hexadecimal cells specify exact bytes without quotes, line endings or extra characters. |
| PROVENANCE | MAC ≠ public signature | A valid MAC replaces neither a public-key signature nor provenance analysis. It does not date the message or, alone, prevent replay of an old valid request. |
RFC 4231 cases 1 and 2. Key, data and result in hexadecimal; public test keys.
| Case | Key (hex) | Data (hex) | HMAC-SHA-256 (hex) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b | 4869205468657265 | b0344c61d8db38535ca8afceaf0bf12b881dc200c9833da726e9376c2e32cff7 |
| 2 | 4a656665 | 7768617420646f2079612077616e7420666f72206e6f7468696e673f | 5bdcc146bf60754e6a042426089575c75a003f089d2739839dec58b964ec3843 |
RFC 4231 §§ 4.2–4.3. Copyright © 2005 The Internet Society.
Displayed keys are public test vectors. No key input is requested; tables document reference results without authenticating real documents or APIs.
No. Retain the expected construction and contract: algorithm, key, covered bytes and contextual fields. Equal-length results can serve different functions.
Documentation consulted on .
DEEPER READING / PRACTICE
Two files have the same name, or a document must be preserved for a later check. A cryptographic hash compares their content without relying on the displayed name or date.
Updated on .
Calculate the hash of the file concerned and keep the algorithm, size and reference. Compare with the expected value under the same conditions.
An identical hash does not demonstrate the author or the authenticity of the document. A change in metadata or format can change the hash without changing the apparent meaning.
The report retains file, algorithm, value, date and comparison result. It is included in a source chain that also describes the origin and use of the document.
PRACTICAL CASE / WORKED EXAMPLE
The example below is pedagogical. It shows how to move from a document to a qualified proposal, preserving the context, the contradictory elements and the information that the research does not yet allow to establish.
Two files uploaded to different dates carry the same name. Their content does not match exactly, but the visual comparison does not allow to quickly place the difference.
Calculate the footprints with the same algorithm and keep size and dates. Then compare structure and passages when the meaning of the change counts for the file.
The hash difference indicates a difference in binary content. Its documentary importance is examined separately, without automatically concluding to a substantial modification or falsification.
It is used to compare the identity of the content according to the algorithm used. The author, origin and authenticity require other elements of origin and are not determined by the value alone.
DETAILED WORKSHOP / APPLICATION
Prepare file, algorithm, expected value and collection context. Identify the exact compared object to avoid mixing original and variant.
Calculate the hash and keep size, date and result. Compare in the same conditions. If the values differ, then examine the structure or content according to the documentary need.
If the footprints are identical, make a conclusion on the identity of the compared content. Truthfulness, author and origin remain questions that require other elements.
Control is complete when file and method are identified. A binary difference must be interpreted separately from its importance for the meaning or proof.
Transfer file, value and source report. Subsequent comparisons may confirm the preserved status without attributing a broader scope of authentication.
ANNOTATED WORKING DOCUMENT / REVIEW GRID
The report retains the exact file, algorithm, size, date and value. It connects the comparison to the source without attributing to the hash a general authentication scope.
On a small screen, scroll the grid horizontally to read all three columns.
| Observation | Supported interpretation | Next step |
|---|---|---|
| The footprints are identical under the same conditions. | The identity of the compared content can be described according to the algorithm. | Keep the references and other sources. |
| The footprints differ despite the same name. | The files do not present the same binary content. | Consider the difference of structure or meaning according to the need. |
| The value is used to affirm the author. | The binary identity does not demonstrate this attribution. | Find the documentary that is adapted to the original. |
The final verification must identify exactly the compared files. A format or metadata transformation can change the hash without establishing itself a significant change in the word.
REPORTING / EXAMPLE WORDING
The identity of the content must not receive an additional authentication scope.
Identify the exact objects and qualify separately the importance of a binary difference.
The calculated values compare the files and the algorithm indicated. The origin and claims about the author are based on distinct elements.